ElGamal cryptosystem-based secure authentication system for cloud-based IoT applications. IET Networks, 8(5), 289-298. https://doi.Abstract: Life in modern society becomes easier due to rapid growth of different technologies like real-time analytic, ubiquitous wireless communication, commodity sensors, machine learning, and embedded systems. Nowadays, there seems to be a need to merge these technologies in the form of Internet of Things (IoT) so that smart systems can be achieved. On the other hand, cloud computing is a pillar in IoT by which end users get connected through the cloud servers for getting different services. However, to recognize the legitimacy of communicators during communication sessions through insecure channels like the Internet, serious issues in cloud based IoT applications need to be addressed. Thus authentication procedure is highly desirable to remove the unapproved access in IoT applications. This paper presents an ElGamal cryptosystem and biometric information along with a user's password-based authentication scheme for cloud based IoT applications refereed as SAS-Cloud. Security of the proposed scheme has been analyzed by well popular random oracle model and it is found that SAS-Cloud has ability to defend all the possible attacks. Furthermore, performance of SAS-Cloud has been evaluated and it was found that SAS-Cloud has better efficiency than other existing competing ElGamal cryptosystem-based authentication schemes.
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Introduction
In modern society, connection with everyone and everything through Internet enabled electronic devices has become common for smart living [1] . To facilitate this, network research community has been trying to develop such systems so that efficient and reliable communication can be done from remote places. This networking system is known as "Internet of Things" (IoT). IoT can be stated as: it is a system, in which interrelated computing devices, mechanical and digital machines, objects, animals or people that are provided with distinctive identifiers and the ability to transfer data over a network * . There are many application areas for IoT implementation, such as Health Care, Transportation, Industry, Market, Education, Vehicles, Smart Home and Agriculture, among others. The IoT applications are developed on the top of cloud systems [2] , where the cloud system acts as the enabler for the IoT applications as shown in Fig. 1 . The cloud has three main features like SaaS (Software as a Service), SaaS (Storage as a service), PaaS (Platform as a Service), and IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) [2] . Therefore, end users get different services such as medical, educational, industrial and so on, by accessing the cloud server, which is known as the service provider. In IoT applications, Internet enabled things like vehicles and sensors collect data from the area or environment and supply the data to the cloud server. The cloud server processes the data and provides a corresponding feedback. In order to get the data from remote places by accessing the server, the end users have to get permission from the server first and then agree upon a shared secret key for further secure communication within the current session which is known as remote user authentication (see Fig. 1 ). After getting the data, end users can * http://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/Internet-of-Things-IoT also provide a feedback to the Internet enabled e-devices. A huge amount of data transaction takes place in any IoT system. For each case of data transaction, the system needs to check whether the user is authentic or not by the proper efficient and secure authentication protocol. This work concentrates on developing a secure remote user verification scheme in cloud environment of IoT applications.
• Motivation
There are several challenges in case of user authentication techniques. History says that no security could prove absolute secure over long period due to the smart and updated attacker. However, this study finds that most of the existing authentication schemes (can be applied in cloud based applications) do not protect systems from all security attacks. Furthermore, the existing protocols have lack of efficiency in terms of: (a) computational cost, (b) communication cost, (c) inability to detect wrong inputs during login as well as password phases, (d) extra communication overhead to alter the users' password, and (e) disclosure of the users' identity to the attacker. A proper efficient and secure authentication scheme for cloud based IoT applications should overcome or alleviate all the aforementioned issues and provide user friendly facilities.
• Contribution
This paper proposes a secure scheme using biometric information of users and ElGamal cryptosystem. We refer to this here as SAS-Cloud (Secure Authentication Scheme in Cloud based IoT Systems), to build a concrete authentication system for cloud applications. The security of SAS-Cloud is examined using well popular random oracle model, and the efficiency of SAS-Cloud is evaluated and compared with other reported competing schemes. The study is structured as follows. A quick overview of existing authentication protocols is highlighted in the next section. Section 3 describes some mathematical definitions, which are used in the proposed scheme. Section 4 demonstrates the adversary model as well as network model to introduce the proposed scheme. Our ElGamalbased three factor authentication scheme for cloud based IoT application, SAS-Cloud, is described in section 5. Security analysis of the proposed SAS-Cloud scheme and performance comparison of SAS-Cloud with related competing schemes are provided in section 6 and section 7, respectively. Advantages to used the proposed SAS-Cloud is given in section 8. The concluding remarks of this paper are stated in section 9.
Related Work
Lamport [3] first introduced a password-based authentication scheme using one way hash function. Thereafter many user authentication schemes [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] have been presented in this regard, which are based on only password for various Internet based applications. Jain et al. in [11] mentioned that biometric information based technology produces an effective verification tool in wireless communication. Furthermore, in many commercial, civilian, and forensic applications, biometric systems have been installed to verify identity of users [11] . Therefore, the researchers have appraised biometric with the password to amplify the degree of security [12] . Research community of this study have suggested various password and biometric based authentication schemes in [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Tan [13] presented a threefactor authentication scheme in 2013. According to Yan et al. [14] , the scheme [13] is insecure from the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack and suggested their own scheme. However, Mishra et al. [15] showed that the scheme in [14] can not protect the off-line password guessing attack and it has incompetent login, and password change phases. Chuang and Chen [16] also proposed a biometric based authentication scheme, which can be applied in cloud environment. Maitra and Giri [17] stated that an adversary can create forge message on Chuang and Chen's scheme [16] , and introduced a counter measure scheme in [17] . Very recently, Wazid et al. [19] also introduced a biometric-based authentication scheme in cloud environment and after evaluating their proposed scheme through formal security analysis, the authors claimed that the proposed scheme is secure from security threats. However, the discussed authentication protocols are based on only hash function, thus the security of those schemes are dependant on hardness of one-way hash function. On the other hand, authentication using public key cryptography like RSA based [21, 22] , ElGamal based [23] , Robin cryptosystem based [24] , ECC-based [25] [26] [27] , Bilinear Pairing based [28, 29] and so on is also well popular in the literature. However, this paper aims to design an authentication scheme for cloud based IoT application using ElGamal cryptosystem [30] . Hence we discuss only the authentication protocols using ElGamal cryptosystem reported in [23, [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] . Hwang and Li [23] proposed an ElGamal based authentication protocol without using any password verification table in order to eliminate password stolen attack at the server end. The authors claimed that the proposed protocol can resist different known attacks. Chan and Cheng [31] identified that different kinds of security attacks like password guessing attack, impersonation attacks, man-in the-middle attack and DoS attack can be mounted in the protocol [23] . Shen et al. [32] also proved that the protocol provided in [23] is defenceless against masquerading attack, therefore Shen et al. demonstrated a solution to prevent the masquerading attack on Hwang and Li's scheme by proposing an enhanced scheme in [32] . However, the modified protocol [32] , proposed by Shen et al. is not totally secured as pointed out by Leung et al. in [33] . Yoon et al. [34] proposed a new smart card based client server authentication protocol using ElGamal signature and claimed that their protocol can resist forgery attack. However, Tian et al. in [35] argued that the protocol in [34] cannot make absolute protection against forgery attack and proposed a modified protocol in [35] . Ramasamy and Muniyandi [36] introduced a smart card based authentication protocol using ElGamal cryptosystem claiming that their protocol can withstand all the possible security threats like parallel session attack, forgery attack and denial of service attack. However Lee et al. [37] figured out that the Ramasamy and Muniyandi's scheme [36] cannot prevent all kind of attacks and they have proposed a new smart card based authentication protocol in [37] to overcome the shortcoming. Very recently, Maitra et al. [38] showed that an adversary can mount forgery attack as well as password guessing attack on Lee et al.'s scheme [37] after stealing the smart card of a legal user.
Preliminaries

Definition 1.
A cryptographic hash function [17, 20] can be represented as: H : S 1 → S 2 , where S 1 , a binary string of random length is taken as an input to produce a binary string S 2 of fixed length l. The cryptographic hash function H(·) is said to be collision-resistant, if the following condition is maintained:
where P r[E] represents the random event E produced by an adversary A for the time span t 1 and Adv H A (t 1 ) ≤ η 1 , for any small η 1 > 0 is the probability of advantage to find two different binary strings a 1 and a 2 over time span t 1 . [12] has two procedures: one is Gen, which can be represented as Gen : M S → φ × θ, where M S is a binary string i.e., biometric information B (a binary string after extracting feature of biometric by some well known mechanism like singular point extraction for fingerprint [39] ), φ is a random string and θ is an auxiliary string, and another procedure is Rep, which can be represented as Rep : M S × θ → φ. The fuzzy extractor FE is called collision-resistant if following condition is maintained:
where P r[E] represents the random event E produced by an adversary A for the time span t 2 and Adv F E A (t 2 ) ≤ η 2 , for any small η 2 > 0 is the probability of advantage to find two different biometric strings B and B . Note that des(·) is a distance measurement function like Hamming distance between two different binary strings and δd is a distance tolerance value. However, both des(·) and δd are pre-defined in fuzzy extractor system and same for all users' biometric. [38] states that it is hard to obtain a ∈ Z * p from known inputs A, p and g such that A = g a mod p for any prime number p. DLP can be called a hard problem if the following condition is maintained:
Definition 3. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
where P r[E] represents the random event E produced by an adversary A for the time span t 3 and Adv D A (t 3 ) ≤ η 3 , for any small η 3 > 0 is the probability of advantage to find a from given A.
Models
This section will discuss network and adversary models to introduce the proposed SAS-Cloud.
Network Model
According to the architecture of the proposed scheme, through enrollment procedure, users have to register to a service provider SP to get their registration conformation (See Fig. 2(a) ). For this purpose, users send a request for registration to SP in off-line or personally. After getting the request, SP provides some registration information to the users so that the users can use this information in login time. Whenever a registered user wants to get service from SP by accessing the mobile application via insecure channel, the user transmits a login message to SP. Upon checking the login message, SP gives reply to the user. After getting the reply, the user verifies the reply message (See Fig. 2(b) ). For the correct reply, both the user and SP agree on a secret and common session key [40] .
Threat Model
This study has considered the threat model proposed by Dolev-Yao [41] to evaluate the security of the SAS-Cloud. According to this model [41] , the communicating parties convey their message through an insecure channel during login as well as authentication phases. Therefore, an attacker A can capture the transmitted messages, and furthermore A can alter or delete the contents of the messages as shown in Fig. 2(b) . The attacker A also acquires the information, which is stored in the user's electronic device like mobile phone, tablet or laptop by monitoring the consumption of power [42] . According to the threat model, this paper considers the following two attackers:
• Attacks by Outsider. A third party A (as an attacker), who is unrelated to this system may try to hamper in the authentication procedure by mounting various attacks. . • Attacks by Insider. A valid user A (as an attacker), who is a part of the system may try to obtain confidential information of the server so that A can inject several attacks on the authentication system.
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SAS-Cloud: The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we present a secure authentication scheme for IoT application using fuzzy extractor and ElGamal Cryptosystem, called as SAS-Cloud. Symbols and their uses are given in Table 1 . SAS-Cloud has five phases namely, (a) set-up phase, (b) enrollment phase, (c) login phase, (d) authentication with key agreement phase and (e) password update phase.
Set-up Phase
A service provider SP executes algorithm K to get a large prime number q. SP picks a cyclic multiplicative group G of order q with a generator g. Then it picks a number s randomly such that s ∈ R Z * q and computes P K = g s mod q. Furthermore, it selects a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k , where k is an integer number with fixed length. Ultimately, SP declares public information P aram = G, P K, g, q, H(·) and keeps s as secret key.
Enrollment Phase
Whenever a new user U i likes to enroll in the service provider SP, registration phase is invoked using the steps shown below:
1. The user U i opens the application from his/her electronic gadget and inputs his/her biometric feature (i.e., fingerprint) to a sensor 
. SP then checks that D i exists in its list or not. If it is exist, SP gives a negative acknowledgement (i.e., decline message) to U i because, received ID i is not unique and it may be used by another user. In such case, U i has to selects another identity until unique identity is not acquired. If D i does not exist in its list, SP calculates C i = A i ⊕ PWR i and sends a registration information C i , D i , des(·), δd to U i through a private channel, where des(·) is a distance measurement function (defined in Definition 2 of Section 3). SP then updates its list U_List by incorporating D i into it. 4. After receiving the registration information C i , D i , des(·), δd ,
, δd into the memory of his/her electronic gadget like mobile phone. Note that, this study assumes that extracted feature from biometric i.e., binary string B i and result of hash value are same bits long, which are n bits. Fig. 3 shows the pictorial view of enrollment phase.
Login Phase
If a registered user U i likes to get entry into the system by accessing the service provider SP, login phase is invoked. U i opens the application from mobile and provides his/her biometric information B * i via sensor, identity ID i and password PW i to the mobile. The mobile then computes the following procedures:
If it does not satisfying the condition, U i will be rejected; otherwise, it computes the next step.
The mobile calculates
If equality does not preserve, the mobile refuses U i ; otherwise, it computes the next step. 3. The mobile selects a number r i ∈ R Z * q randomly and computes
. U i then transmits a login request message DID i , G i , F i to SP through Internet (a public channel). Note that U i operates his/her mobile thus, mobile of U i sends the login message on behalf of U i . However, in this study, we use mobile device of U i and U i , alternatively.
Authentication with Key Agreement Phase
Upon getting the login request message DID i , G i , F i from U i , SP computes the following steps:
and further checks F * i =? F i . For the inequality, SP rejects the login message of U i ; otherwise, it goes to the next step. 3. SP selects a number y i ∈ R Z * q random and further computes
and sends a reply message Q i , L i to U i via a insecure channel. SP accepts SK i as a common and secret session key.
After getting the reply message Q i , L i from SP, the mobile of U i performs the following step to authenticate the reply message of SP:
If the equality is satisfied, U i concurs upon the common secret key SK i (= SK i ); otherwise, it refuses the reply message. Fig. 4 depicts a pictorial view of login and authentication with key agreement phases.
Password Update Phase
If a user U i likes to alter his/her password, this phase is invoked. U i opens the application from mobile and provides his/her biometric information B * i through sensor, identity ID i and password PW i to the mobile. The mobile then executes the following steps: For not satisfying the condition, U i will be rejected; otherwise, it computes the next step.
The mobile calculates
and verifies D i =? D i . If equality does not hold, U i will be rejected; otherwise, the mobile device is allowed to enter a new password.
U i picks a new password PW
[new] i and inputs it to the mobile. The mobile then executes PWR
Security Analysis of SAS-Cloud
This study has done the formal security analysis of SAS-Cloud under the random oracle model. We define the random oracles for the formal security analysis of SAS-Cloud as follows:
• • Random oracle OracleD keeps a tuple c 1 , c 2 , g, q such that c 2 = g c1 mod q. It produces c 1 from c 2 upon getting a query (qD, c 2 ) if c 1 , c 2 exists in its tuple; otherwise, supplies a number r 5 randomly. Then it reserves r 5 , c 2 , g, q into its tuple as a new entry . 
Asks OracleH on the input A * i to get the information s and IDi)) as (s * ID * * * Proof: This study constructs an attacker A who has the ability to obtain the password PW i , identity ID i and biometric information B i of U i . In this regards, this work assumes that the mobile device of a user U i is lost or stolen. Therefore, A can obtain the stored information C i , D i , B i , θ i from the memory of mobile of U i by calculating power consumption [42] . The attacker A also captures the login request message DID i , G i , F i and a reply message Q i , L i . The adversary A executes the experiment, EXP 1 oracle A, SAS−Cloud for our secure authentication scheme (SAS-Cloud) to get the password PW i , identity ID i and biometric parameter B i of the user U i as discussed in Algorithm 1. This study defines the success probability for EXP 1 oracle
Then the advantage of EXP 1 oracle A, SAS−Cloud is given by Adv1 oracle A, SAS−Cloud (t, qH, qFE) = max A {Succ1 oracle A, SAS−Cloud }, where the maximum is considered over all A with the implementation time t, qH and qFE are the # of queries submitted to OracleH and OracleFE oracles, respectively. It can be said that SAS-Cloud is provably secure against the attacker A for obtaining the password PW i , identity ID i and biometric information Algorithm 1) shows that, if A earns success to execute the reverse of cryptographic hash function H(·) and can explore the hardness of fuzzy extractor, then A will correctly obtain the password PW i , identity ID i and biometric parameter B i of U i by employing random oracles OracleH and OracleFE, respectively, and secures the win in this game. However, according to Definitions 1 and 2, we can write that Adv OracleH A (t) ≤ η 1 , for any negligible η 1 > 0 and Adv OracleF E A (t) ≤ η 2 , for any negligible η 2 > 0. Therefore, we get Adv1 oracle A, SAS−Cloud (t, qH, qFE) ≤ η, for any negligible η > 0 as the SAS-Cloud depends on both Adv OracleH A (t) and Adv OracleF E A (t). Therefore, SAS-Cloud provides the security against the attacker A for obtaining the password PW i , identity ID i and biometric information B i of U i . Theorem 2. Under the assumption that DLP and cryptographic hash function H(·) represent the random oracles, SAS-Cloud is provably secure against an attacker A for getting the private key s of service provider SP even if A knows the parameters that are reserved into U i 's mobile and captures the communication messages between U i and SP.
Proof: This work constructs an attacker A who has the ability to get the private key s of the service provider SP. However, we consider the same suppositions discussed in Theorem 1. The attacker A executes the experiment, EXP 2 oracle A, SAS−Cloud for the secure authentication scheme (SAS-Cloud) to get the private key s of the service provider SP as provided in Algorithm 2.
We define the success probability for EXP 2 oracle Output: 0 or 1; 0: Fail, 1: Win 1: Asks OracleH on the input Di to obtain the information Ai (= H(s IDi)) as (A * i ) ← OracleH(Di) 2: Asks OracleH on the input Fi to get the information Ai, ri and Ei as (r * i E * i A * * i ) ← OracleH(Fi) 3: Asks OracleD on the input P K (= g s mod q) to obtain the information s as (s * ) ← OracleD(P K) 4: Asks OracleH on the input Li to get the information SKi, IDi and Ai as (ID * i SK * i A * * * i ) ← OracleH(Li) 5: Asks OracleD on the input Gi (= g r i mod q) and g to get the information ri as (r * * i ) ← OracleD(Gi, g)
Asks OracleH on the input A * i to get the information s and IDi)) as (s * * ID * * * Theorem 3. Under the assumption that the DLP and cryptographic hash function H(·) represent the random oracles, SAS-Cloud is provably secure against an attacker A for obtaining the common secret session key SK i between U i and SP even if A knows the parameters that are reserved into U i 's mobile device and captures the communication messages between U i and SP.
Proof: This work constructs an attacker A who has ability to obtain the session key SK i between a user and the service provider SP. However, we consider the same suppositions discussed in Theorem 1. The attacker A executes the experiment, EXP 3 oracle A, SAS−Cloud for the secure authentication scheme (SAS-Cloud) to obtain the session key SK i between U i and SP as given in Algorithm 3.
We define the success probability of EXP 3 oracle OracleH and OracleD oracles, respectively. We can say SAS-Cloud is provably secure against the attacker A for obtaining the session key SK i between U i and the service provider SP, if Adv3 oracle A, SAS−Cloud (t, qH) ≤ η 1 , for any negligible η 1 > 0 and Adv3 oracle A, SAS−Cloud (t, qD) ≤ η 2 , for any negligible η 2 > 0. EXP 3 oracle A, SAS−Cloud (discussed in Algorithm 3) shows, if the attacker A is able to calculate reverse of the cryptographic hash function H(·) and also cracks DLP, then A can get success to derive the session key SK i by employing the OracleH and OracleD random oracles, and gets victory in the game. Nevertheless, after observing Definition 1 and Definition 3, we can write Adv OracleH A (t) ≤ η 1 , for any negligible η 1 > 0 and Adv OracleD A (t) ≤ η 2 , for any negligible η 2 > 0. Since, we obtain Adv3 oracle A, SAS−Cloud (t, qH, qD) ≤ η, for any negligible η > 0 as, SAS-Cloud depends on Adv OracleH A (t) as well as Adv OracleD A (t). Thus, the proposed SAS-Cloud is providing security against A for obtaining SK i between the user U i and the service provider SP.
Theorem 4.
A registered user U A as an attacker cannot extract the private key s of the service provider SP even if he/she has stored parameters into his/her mobile device.
Proof: A registered user say, U i as an attacker A may try to login into SAS-Cloud as an another valid user say, U j . To do so, A must knows the private key s of the service provider SP. Since, A is a legal user, A knows his/her identity ID i , password PW i and biometric parameter φ i . Therefore, A is able to calculate H(s ID i ) by executing C i ⊕ H(PW i φ i ), where C i is the stored information into his/her mobile device. However, from H(s ID i ), A unable to derive s due to hardness of the reverse of cryptographic hash function. In addition, Theorem 2 exhibits that s cannot be derived from familiar parameters. As a result, A cannot produce any security attacks on SAS-Cloud. IET Output: 0 or 1; 0: Fail, 1: Win 1: Asks OracleH on the input Di to obtain the information Ai (= H(s IDi)) as (A * i ) ← OracleH(Di) 2: Asks OracleH on the input Fi to get the information Ai, ri and Ei as (r * i E * i A * * i ) ← OracleH(Fi) 3: Asks OracleD on the input P K (= g s mod q) to retrieve the information s as (s * ) ← OracleD(P K) 4: Asks OracleH on the input Li to get the information SKi, IDi and Ai as (ID * i SK * i A * * * i ) ← OracleH(Li) 5: Asks OracleD on the input Gi (= g r i mod q) to retrieve the information ri as (r * * i ) ← OracleD(Gi)
Executes SK * * i = H(y * i r * i ) 12:
if (SK * i == SK * * i ) then 13:
SK * i is accepted as the common session key 14:
Return 1 
Remarks on Proposed Theorems
Theorem 1 demonstrates that SAS-Cloud is providing security against the off-line password guessing attack.
In SAS-Cloud, A cannot produce the forgery attack without knowing the PW i and biometric information B i of a user U i and the private key s of the service provider SP. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 show that the confidential parameters of the service provider and the user are well protected from the attacker. As a result, there is no feasibility to produce the forgery attack on SAS-Cloud.
Furthermore, Theorem 3 shows that SAS-Cloud can protect the session key obtaining attack because, without any knowledge of random nonce(s) r i and y i , A cannot derive the session key SK i .
In SAS-Cloud, the communicating messages are computed using random numbers. Hence, the messages are assuring to be nonidentical for each session. As a result, A cannot create the replay attack on SAS-Cloud. In addition, Denial of Service (DoS) attack is easily identified in SAS-Cloud (See Section 8).
Performance Evaluation
Here, the performances of SAS-Cloud are compared with the competing existing authentication schemes namely, Tan [37] . The compared schemes in [13-16, 23, 32, 34, 36, 37] are not usable for practical scenarios because, these schemes are not resisting the security attacks (See Table 2 ). In the related work section of this work, we have described that most of the proposed schemes are insecure against security attacks. Furthermore, analysis of security of SAS-Cloud (see Section 6) shows that it can protect all the possible attacks. Therefore, SAS-Cloud is more secure than other schemes. Table 3 is given to show the storage cost, computational cost and communication overhead comparison of the schemes in [13-16, 23, 32, 34, 36, 37] with the proposed SAS-Cloud. Here, only login and authentication phases have been considered due to rapid and maximum use during online cloud services. On the other hand, registration of users is done offline and this phase is used only one time in the authentication systems. Therefore, communication and computational costs of registration phase can be neglected with respect to login and authentication phases. T EX P , T H , T M , T EN C and T DEC are the times required for exponentiation operation, hash operation, multiplication operation, symmetric key encryption and decryption respectively. However, it is well known that exponentiation operation takes more time than other operations and order of execution time can be expressed as: T EX P >> T H ≈ T EN C / T DEC > T M [17] . SAS-Cloud takes time for three exponentiation operation in two phases, which is the lower among ElGamal-based schemes in [23, 32, 34, 36, 37] . However, according to MIRACL C/C++ Library with the specifications of system (i.e., processor: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4210U CPU @ 1.70GHz 2.40 GHz; RAM: 8 GB; 64-bit Windows 10; Visual C++ 2008 software), the time complexity of the different cryptographic operations is roughly calculated as follows: (1) T EN C / T DEC : For private key en/decryption, the time complexity is ≈ 0.1303 ms, (2) T H : For cryptographic hash function, the time complexity is ≈ 0.0004 ms, (3) T EX P : Time complexity for exponentiation is ≈ 1.8269 ms, and (4) T M : Time to execute multiplication operation is ≈ 0.0147 ms. According to the aforementioned information, a comparison graph (see Fig. 5 ) has been given as an evidence to show that SAS-Cloud takes less time to execute than related ElGamal cryptosystem based schemes. Here, we assume that the length of ID i and PW i are 64 bits each. Cryptographic hash function H(·), threshold value δd, symmetric key encryp- [13] al. [14] al. [15] Chen [16] Li [23] al. [32] al. [34] Muniyandi [36] al. [37] SA 1 - [34, 36, 37] . The storage cost of SAS-Cloud is (128 + 128 + 128 + 128) = 512 bits, which is also less than related schemes in [14-16, 23, 32, 34, 36] . After resisting all possible attacks (based on random oracle model) as discussed in Section 6, SAS-Cloud has better trade-off among communication, computational and storage costs compared to the existing related schemes.
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Satisfaction to Use of SAS-Cloud 1. Efficient login system: By some unwanted mistakes, if a user U i inputs a faulty password as well as faulty identity in login phase of SAS-Cloud, the mobile device can identify the incorrect inputs before going to create a login message. This is because, the mobile calculates B i = B i ⊕ H(ID i PW i ) and verifies des(B * i , B i ) ≤ δd. For the incorrectness, the mobile discards U i ; otherwise, it computes θ i = θ i ⊕ H(ID i PW i ), φ i ← Rep(B * i , θ i ), PWR i = H(PW i φ i ), A i = C i ⊕ PWR i , D i = H(A i ) and compares D i =? D i . For the dissimilar result, the mobile discards U i ; otherwise, considers PW i and ID i as correct inputs. Therefore, in SAS-Cloud for the wrong inputs, no login message will be generated which reduces extra communication overhead. 2. Efficient password update system: By some unwanted mistakes, if a user U i inputs a faulty password as well as faulty identity in login phase of SAS-Cloud, the mobile device can identify the incorrect inputs before giving licence to the users to select their new password. This is because, the mobile follows the same steps as mentioned above to verify the correctness of entered inputs. Only for the correct inputs, the mobile gives licence to U i to select new password. On the other hand, to update the password of a user, there is no need any communication between the mobile device and the IET Research Journals, pp. 1-11 c The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2015 9
ReView by River Valley Technologies IET Networks 2019/03/12 11:07:17 IET Review Copy Only service provider. Hence, overhead for the communications is also decrease in SAS-Cloud. 3 . Identify of Denial of Service (DoS) attack: Before going to create a login message, mobile device checks the password, biometric and identity of a user U i in SAS-Cloud. That means, for any wrong input from user, mobile device does not generate login message. Now, if a login request message of U i is discarded by service provider SP, then it can be said that the login message has been tampered with another party (i.e., attacker) or corrupted by some reasons. Therefore, the user may take necessary action to stop DoS attack by informing service provider. 4. Satisfaction of mutual authentication: In SAS-Cloud, the service provider SP calculates and agrees on a secret session key SK i after checking the authenticity of the user U i through login message and after that, SP transmits a reply message to U i . Similarly, U i goes for the same secret session key SK i with SP after checking the authenticity of SP through reply message. Hence, two-way verification has been done in SAS-Cloud. Beside this, SAS-Cloud can protect all the possible security attacks (see, Section 6). Hence, SAS-Cloud satisfies mutual authentication.
Untraceability of user:
In SAS-Cloud, identity of a user U i is dynamic for every session. This is because, DID i is computed as (ID i r i ) · E i mod q, where E i = P K ri mod q and r i is a random number, which will be non-identical for each session in random fashion. Thus for different sessions, DID i will be changed and as security analysis of SAS-Cloud (see Theorem 1) shows that ID i cannot be extracted from known parameter for an adversary. Therefore, it can be claimed that the adversary cannot trace the user, which means the adversary is unable to locate the valid user's existence.
Conclusion
This work observed that most of the authentication protocols using hash function and ElGamal cryptosystem for cloud based applications are affected by security attacks and are unable to hide the actual identities of the end users during login session. Therefore, this work has introduced a secure ElGamal-based authentication scheme called SAS-Cloud. Analysis of security of SAS-Cloud using random oracle model shows that it is secure from all possible attacks. Performance comparison of SAS-Cloud with competing schemes has shown that the proposed scheme is more efficient than these competing schemes. In addition, as biometric features like finger print, iris scan, retina scan, and hand geometry are used with password in SAS-Cloud, therefore they can improve the security label of password-based authentication scheme. In future, this work will be extended to provide secure authentication among cloud server and Internet enabled devices so that a complete security framework can be build for IoT applications.
